Category: Uncategorized (page 13 of 20)
Conference Wittgenstein: Naturalism and Necessity
Department of PhilosophyWittgenstein Archives BergenUniversity of Bergen, Norway 21-22 November 2019
We invite submissions of 500-word abstracts (excluding references) sent to sorin.bangu@uib.no and kevin.cahill@uib.no. Please use ‘Wittgenstein conference’ in the subject line.
Deadline 25 August, decisions by 20 September. Length of the talk: 25 min + 20 min Q&A. There is no registration fee, but the contributed speakers will have to arrange their travel to, and accommodation in Bergen (organizers can provide logistical assistance).
The conference will include invited talks by Juliet Floyd (Boston), Oskari Kuusela (East Anglia), Alexander George (Amherst College), Annalisa Coliva (UC Irvine), Severin Schroeder (Reading), William Child (Oxford).
Possible paper topics:
– Questions about Wittgenstein’s naturalism and necessity, logico-mathematical and/or metaphysical
– Differences and similarities between Wittgenstein’s naturalism and other naturalist approaches (e.g. Quine’s scientific naturalism, Maddy’s second philosophy, etc.)
– Anthropological and cultural aspects, as related to Wittgenstein’s famous remark that “mathematics is after all an anthropological phenomenon” (RFM VII-33)
The themes mentioned above indicate only a few possible directions for presentations. The common thread is exploring issues concerning Wittgenstein’s naturalism, his take on necessity and their relation to his philosophy of mathematics (and logic) — including, but not limited to, his views on the foundations of set-theory.
For the latest news concerning the Vienna Edition, featuring an updated publication schedule indicating estimated publishing dates for the respective volumes, please visit
ISPUTATIO. Philosophical Research Bulletin (Madrid, ISSN: 2254-0601), is pleased to announce the publication of the second advance of Special Issue: Linguistic and Rational Pragmatism: The Philosophies of Wittgenstein and Brandom.
DISPUTATIO. Boletín de Investigación Filosófica (Madrid, ISSN: 2254-0601), se complace en anunciar la publicación del segundo avance del número especial: Pragmatismo lingüístico y racional: las filosofías de Wittgenstein y Brandom.
TABLA DE CONTENIDOS | TABLE OF CONTENTS
ARTÍCULOS | ARTICLES
Vojtěch Kolman
“What the Picture Tells Me Is Itself”: The Reflexivity of Knowledge between Brandom and Wittgenstein
[«Lo que el retrato me relata es a sí mismo»: la reflexividad del conocimiento entre Brandom y Wittgenstein] (English)
“What the Picture Tells Me Is Itself”: The Reflexivity of Knowledge between Brandom and Wittgenstein
Tomasz Zarębski
Does Language Have an Essence? From Wittgenstein via Rhees to Brandom
[¿El lenguaje tiene una esencia? De Wittgenstein vía Rhees a Brandom] (English)
Does Language Have an Essence? From Wittgenstein via Rhees to Brandom
Pietro Salis
Does language have a downtown? Wittgenstein, Brandom, and the game of “giving and asking for reasons”
[¿El lenguaje tiene un centro? Wittgenstein, Brandom y el juego de dar y pedir razones?] (English)
Does language have a downtown? Wittgenstein, Brandom, and the game of “giving and asking for reasons”
Sybren Heyndels
A Regress of Justification? Brandom and Wittgenstein on Certainty and Reasonable Doubt
[¿Una regresión de justificación? Brandom y Wittgenstein sobre la certeza y la duda razonable] (English)
A Regress of Justification? Brandom and Wittgenstein on Certainty and Reasonable Doubt
Florian Franken Figueiredo
Brandom and Wittgenstein: Disagreements on how to be in agreement with a rule
[Wittgenstein y Brandom: desacuerdos sobre estar de acuerdo con una regla] (English)
Brandom and Wittgenstein: Disagreements on how to be in agreement with a rule
Daniel E. Kalpokas
Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom’s Normative Pragmatics
[Percepción: un punto ciego en la pragmática normativa de Brandom] (English)
Perception: A Blind Spot in Brandom’s Normative Pragmatics
Juan José Acero
Wittgenstein vs. Chomsky: To Shorten the Distance
[Wittgenstein vs. Chomsky: recortando distancias] (Spanish)
Wittgenstein vs. Chomsky: To Shorten the Distance
Manuel de Pinedo
Two Forms of Quietism: What can be Spoken About in Philosophy?
[Dos formas de quietismo: ¿De qué se puede hablar en filosofía?] (Spanish)
Two Forms of Quietism: What can be Spoken About in Philosophy?
Freddy O. Santamaría; Simon Ruiz Martínez
What does it mean to belong to a community?
[¿Qué significa pertenecer a una comunidad?] (Spanish)
What does it mean to belong to a community?
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WITTGENSTEIN
(I am therefore I think)
The world is all that is the case
Totality of facts not things
If it can be said
It can be thought
And imagination takes wings
To think, to say that this is true
Demands we might be wrong
Negation is the dark
That lets the light be seen
Act sires thought: the singer writes the song
Without us the violin makes no sound
The notes and signs don’t play
Just endless possibility
We must set the music free
What we think in what we say
Instinctive certitude is the hinge
That carries knowing’s door
The world begins as given
Furniture for mind
So grounded thoughts can soar
What cannot be said must be shown
No rules if I cannot wrongly apply
Though there are limits to what I see
This field has no boundary
To tell the truth, demands the lie
We cannot will the world to change
We must act to make it so
Freedom makes us choose
To win means we might lose
We may be sure but cannot know
I have my father’s eyes, my mother’s hands
My brother sounds like me
My daughter has my mother’s smile
My son her sense of style
But no one trait defines our family
I give you no theories no plans no schemes
Patterns are there immune to chance
Look, then act, then see
Together we learn how to be
Meaning is always a beautiful dance
Link to CfP: http://www.f.bg.ac.rs/bpa/call-for-papers.html#topic2
Call for Papers: Skepticism
Belgrade Philosophical Annual – Issue 32, Year 2019
Institute for Philosophy, University of Belgrade
ISSN: 0353-3891
Guest Editor
Živan Lazović (University of Belgrade)
Invited Contributors
Annalisa Coliva (University of California, Irvine)
Michael Blome-Tillmann (McGill University)
Submission Deadline
September 1, 2019
Notes
The main aim of this special issue is to illuminate a variety of topics central to contemporary discussions of skepticism, a philosophical view that calls into question the very possibility of knowledge about the external world. Skeptical reasoning comes in many different forms, but the most powerful of those proceeds by means of the skeptical hypothesis that produces an unsettling outcome: we cannot know anything about the external world since we cannot successfully rule out that we are being deceived by an evil genius (or in another analogous way). The issue will consider the following variety of responses to this form of skepticism which have been prominent in epistemology over the last few decades: contextualism, neo-Moorean responses, semantic externalism, Wittgensteinian approach and relativism. Other related issues include infallibilism, fallibilism, deductive closure, relevant alternatives, modal conditions on knowledge, the role of presuppositions in knowledge, etc. We also encourage papers on the possibility of the world being a full-scale simulation as a recent prominent form of the skeptical challenge.
All inquires and submissions should be directed to the editor of the special issue at zlazovic@f.bg.ac.rs or to the journal editor (S. Perović) at sperovic@f.bg.ac.rs
Submitted papers should be prepared for blind review. All other relevant information should be sent in a separate document containing author’s name and affiliation, the title of the paper, short abstract of not more than 250 words, and 4-5 keywords. All documents should be in a *.doc, *.docx, or *.pdf format.
Belgrade Philosophical Annual is an open access academic journal published by the Institute for Philosophy, University of Belgrade, committed to the double blind peer reviewing process. Previous issues of the journal, including previous special issues with downloadable papers and other relevant information, can be accessed at www.f.bg.ac.rs/bpa.Link to CfP: http://www.f.bg.ac.rs/bpa/call-for-papers.html#topic2
—
Slobodan Perović
Department of Philosophy
University of Belgrade, Serbia http://slobodanperovic.weebly.com/
—
Slobodan Perović
Department of Philosophy
University of Belgrade, Serbia http://slobodanperovic.weebly.com/
The University of Bergen, Philosophy Department welcomes applications for a PhD fellowship within the research project “Mathematics with a Human Face: Set Theory within a Naturalized Wittgensteinean Framework”, funded by the Norwegian Research Council. Project leaders Sorin Bangu and Kevin Cahill.
All information available here:https://www.jobbnorge.no/en/available-jobs/job/169580/phd-research-fellowship-in-wittgenstein-and-the-philosophy-of-mathematics
3-year funding award for the research project
“Intercultural Understanding, Belonging and Value: Wittgensteinian Approaches” 💫
Funded by the Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (Spain)
Principal Investigator: Chon Tejedor (University of Valencia)
Research Team:
• Carla Carmona (University of Sevilla)
• David Pérez-Chico (University of Zaragoza)
• Nicolas Sanchez Dura (University of Valencia)
• Vicente Sanfélix Vidarte (University of Valencia)
• Chon Tejedor (University of Valencia)
Research Working Plan group:
• Juliet Floyd (Boston University)
• Elise Marrou (La Sorbonne)
• Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (University of Hertfordshire & BWS)
• Constantine Sandis (University of Hertfordshire & BWS)
• Roger Teichmann (University of Oxford)
DISPUTATIO. Boletín de Investigación Filosófica (Madrid, ISSN: 2254-0601), se complace en anunciar la publicación del primer avance del número especial: Pragmatismo lingüístico y racional: las filosofías de Wittgenstein y Brandom.
TABLA DE CONTENIDOS | TABLE OF CONTENTS
ARTÍCULOS | ARTICLES
Robert B. Brandom
Asserting
[Afirmar] (English-Spanish Edition)
http://disputatio.eu/vols/vol-8-no-9/brandom-asserting/
John McDowell
How Not to Read Philosophical Investigations: Brandom’s Wittgenstein
[Cómo no leer las Investigaciones Filosóficas: El Wittgenstein de Brandom] (English-Spanish Edition)
http://disputatio.eu/vols/vol-8-no-9/mcdowell-wittgenstein/
Robert B. Brandom
Some Strands of Wittgenstein’s Normative Pragmatism, and Some Strains of his Semantic Nihilism
[Algunas vertientes del pragmatismo normativo de Wittgenstein y algunas tensiones de su nihilismo semántico] (English)
http://disputatio.eu/vols/vol-8-no-9/brandom-pragmatism/
Simon Blackburn
Wittgenstein and Brandom: Affinities and Divergences
[Wittgenstein y Brandom: afinidades y divergencias] (English)
http://disputatio.eu/vols/vol-8-no-9/blackburn-wittgenstein/
Danielle Macbeth
Wittgenstein and Brandom on Normativity and Sociality
[Wittgenstein y Brandom sobre normatividad y socialidad] (English)
http://disputatio.eu/vols/vol-8-no-9/macbeth-normativity/
Bernhard Weiss
Normativity: A Matter of Keeping Score or of Policing?
[Normatividad: ¿una cuestión de puntaje o de monitoreo?] (English)
http://disputatio.eu/vols/vol-8-no-9/weiss-normativity/
María José Frápolli
The Pragmatic Gettier. Brandom on Knowledge and Belief
[El Gettier pragmático: Brandom sobre conocimiento y creencia] (English)
http://disputatio.eu/vols/vol-8-no-9/frapolli-knowledge/
Paul Horwich
Wittgenstein (and his followers) on meaning and normativity
[Wittgenstein (y sus seguidores) sobre significado y normatividad] (English)
http://disputatio.eu/vols/vol-8-no-9/horwich-meaning/
INTERVIEW
María José Frápolli and Kurt Wischin
From Conceptual Content in Big Apes and AI, to the Classical Principle of Explosion: An Interview with Robert B. Brandom
[Del contenido conceptual en los grandes monos e IA, hasta el principio de explosión clásico: una entrevista con Robert B. Brandom] (English)
http://disputatio.eu/vols/vol-8-no-9/frapolli-wischin-interview/
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Los Editores | The Editors.
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